Posted prices exchange for display advertising contracts

Yagil Engel, Moshe Tennenholtz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We propose a new market design for display advertising contracts, based on posted prices. Our model and algorithmic framework address several major challenges: (i) the space of possible impression types is exponential in the number of attributes, which is typically large, therefore a complete price space cannot be maintained; (ii) advertisers are usually unable or reluctant to provide extensive demand (willingness-to- pay) functions, (iii) the levels of detail with which supply and demand are specified are often not identical

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Pages276-282
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013

Conference

Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA
Period14/07/1318/07/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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