Abstract
Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga's failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 113-120 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Analysis and Metaphysics |
| Volume | 10 |
| State | Published - Jan 2011 |
Keywords
- Materialism
- Philosophy
- Positivism
- Realism
- Dualism
- content
- derived intentionality
- dualism
- indication
- intentionality
- materialism
- original intentionality