@inproceedings{cc2ba2be01c442289249139bd216f29f,
title = "Photonic side channel attacks against RSA",
abstract = "This paper describes the first attack utilizing the photonic side channel against a public-key crypto-system. We evaluated three common implementations of RSA modular exponentiation, all using the Karatsuba multiplication method. We discovered that the key length had marginal impact on resilience to the attack: attacking a 2048-bit key required only 9% more decryption attempts than a 1024-bit key. We found that the most dominant parameter impacting the attacker's effort is the minimal block size at which the Karatsuba method reverts to naive multiplication: even for parameter values as low as 32 or 64 bits our attacks achieve 100% success rate with under 10,000 decryption operations. Somewhat surprisingly, we discovered that Montgomery's Ladder - commonly perceived as the most resilient of the three implementations to side-channel attacks - was actually the most susceptible: for 2048-bit keys, our attack reveals 100% of the secret key bits with as few as 4000 decryptions.",
author = "Elad Carmon and Seifert, {Jean Pierre} and Avishai Wool",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 IEEE.; 10th IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2017 ; Conference date: 01-05-2017 Through 05-05-2017",
year = "2017",
month = jun,
day = "16",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2017.7951801",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
series = "Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2017",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "74--78",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, HOST 2017",
address = "الولايات المتّحدة",
}