TY - GEN
T1 - Peripheral authentication for autonomous vehicles
AU - Dolev, Shlomi
AU - Panwar, Nisha
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 IEEE.
PY - 2016/12/8
Y1 - 2016/12/8
N2 - We propose a peripheral authentication scheme for autonomous vehicles. A mutual authentication protocol is required to secure every peripheral device access to a vehicle. Specifically, we present a vehicle to peripheral device authentication scheme. In addition, our three way handshake scheme for vehicle to keyfob authentication scheme based on generalized peripheral authentication scheme has been proposed. The vehicle to keyfob authentication scheme is adapted and improved with an additional attribute verification of the keyfob holder. Conventionally, vehicle to keyfob authentication is realized through a challenge-response verification protocol. An authentic coupling between the vehicle identity and the keyfob avoids any illegal access to the vehicle. However, these authentication messages can be relayed by an active adversary, thereby, can amplify the actual distance between the authentic vehicle and the keyfob. Eventually, through this malicious relaying an adversary can possibly get access to the vehicle, without any effort to generate or decode the crypto credentials. Our solution is a two party, three way handshake scheme with proactive and reactive commitment verification. Conceptually, our solution is different than the distance bounding protocols that requires multiple rounds of round trip delay measurement.
AB - We propose a peripheral authentication scheme for autonomous vehicles. A mutual authentication protocol is required to secure every peripheral device access to a vehicle. Specifically, we present a vehicle to peripheral device authentication scheme. In addition, our three way handshake scheme for vehicle to keyfob authentication scheme based on generalized peripheral authentication scheme has been proposed. The vehicle to keyfob authentication scheme is adapted and improved with an additional attribute verification of the keyfob holder. Conventionally, vehicle to keyfob authentication is realized through a challenge-response verification protocol. An authentic coupling between the vehicle identity and the keyfob avoids any illegal access to the vehicle. However, these authentication messages can be relayed by an active adversary, thereby, can amplify the actual distance between the authentic vehicle and the keyfob. Eventually, through this malicious relaying an adversary can possibly get access to the vehicle, without any effort to generate or decode the crypto credentials. Our solution is a two party, three way handshake scheme with proactive and reactive commitment verification. Conceptually, our solution is different than the distance bounding protocols that requires multiple rounds of round trip delay measurement.
KW - Access control
KW - Authentication
KW - Event data recorders
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85010338845&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2016.7778631
DO - https://doi.org/10.1109/NCA.2016.7778631
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings - 2016 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2016
SP - 282
EP - 285
BT - Proceedings - 2016 IEEE 15th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2016
A2 - Avresky, Dimiter R.
A2 - Gkoulalas-Divanis, Aris
A2 - Di Sanzo, Pierangelo
A2 - Pellegrini, Alessandro
T2 - 15th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications, NCA 2016
Y2 - 30 October 2016 through 2 November 2016
ER -