TY - JOUR
T1 - Partial vertical integration, ownership structure, and foreclosure
AU - Levy, Nadav
AU - Spiegel, Yossi
AU - Gilo, David
N1 - Funding Information: * Levy: Tiomkin School of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), P.O. Box 167 Herzliya 46150, Israel (email: [email protected]); Spiegel: Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel, CEPR, and ZEW (email: [email protected]); Gilo: The Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel (email: [email protected]). The financial assistance of the Israeli Science Foundation grant 1562/12 (Levy and Spiegel), the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel (Spiegel), and the Cegla Center for Interdisiplinary Research (Gilo) is gratefully acknowledged. For helpful discussions and comments we thank an anonymous referee, Jeroen Hinloopen, Albert Banal-Estanol, Bjørn Olav Johansen, Lars Persson, Patrick Rey, and seminar participants in various departments and conferences.
PY - 2018/2/1
Y1 - 2018/2/1
N2 - We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.
AB - We study the incentive to acquire a partial stake in a vertically related firm and then foreclose rivals. We show that whether such partial acquisitions are profitable depends crucially on the initial ownership structure of the target firm and on corporate governance.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041215612&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20160058
DO - 10.1257/mic.20160058
M3 - مقالة
SN - 1945-7669
VL - 10
SP - 132
EP - 180
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
IS - 1
ER -