@inproceedings{f3719d0ca91445fbb33ac484df61f5c5,
title = "Online random sampling for budgeted settings",
abstract = "We study online multi-unit auctions in which each agent{\textquoteright}s private type consists of the agent{\textquoteright}s arrival and departure times, valuation function and budget. Similarly to secretary settings, the different attributes of the agents{\textquoteright} types are determined by an adversary, but the arrival process is random. We establish a general framework for devising truthful random sampling mechanisms for online multi-unit settings with budgeted agents. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to different objective functions (revenue and liquid welfare), and a range of assumptions about the agents{\textquoteright} valuations (additive or general) and the items{\textquoteright} nature (divisible or indivisible). Our main result is the design of mechanisms for additive bidders with budget constraints that extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, for divisible and indivisible items (under a standard large market assumption). We also show a mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal liquid welfare for general valuations over divisible items.",
author = "Alon Eden and Michal Feldman and Adi Vardi",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} Springer International Publishing AG 2017.; 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2017 ; Conference date: 12-09-2017 Through 14-09-2017",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3\_3",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9783319666990",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "29--40",
editor = "Vittorio Bilo and Michele Flammini",
booktitle = "Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, SAGT 2017, Proceedings",
address = "ألمانيا",
}