Abstract
A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if x is the selected utility allocation and πx is also feasible, where π is some permutation, then x= πx. I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 4 |
| Pages (from-to) | 855-863 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2021 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics