No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if x is the selected utility allocation and πx is also feasible, where π is some permutation, then x= πx. I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number4
Pages (from-to)855-863
Number of pages9
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
StatePublished - May 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this