Multiwinner rules with variable number of winners

Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We consider voting rules for approval-based elections that select committees whose size is not predetermined. Unlike the study of rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning candidates, the study of rules that select a variable number of winners has only recently been initiated. We first mention some scenarios for which such rules are applicable. Then, aiming at better understanding these rules, we study their computational properties and report on simulations regarding the sizes of their committees.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationECAI 2020 - 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 - Proceedings
EditorsGiuseppe De Giacomo, Alejandro Catala, Bistra Dilkina, Michela Milano, Senen Barro, Alberto Bugarin, Jerome Lang
PublisherIOS Press BV
Pages67-74
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781643681009
DOIs
StatePublished - 24 Aug 2020
Event24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2020, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 - Santiago de Compostela, Online, Spain
Duration: 29 Aug 20208 Sep 2020

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
Volume325

Conference

Conference24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2020, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020
Country/TerritorySpain
CitySantiago de Compostela, Online
Period29/08/208/09/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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