Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Ella Segev; Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006

Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Ella Segev, Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	371-382
Number of pages	12
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	70
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006
State	Published - 1 Jan 2014

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Sequential contests

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006

Cite this

@article{ba08b83f7efc4f35a87076777a21825d,

title = "Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions",

abstract = "We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.",

keywords = "All-pay auctions, Sequential contests",

author = "Ella Segev and Aner Sela",

year = "2014",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006",

language = "American English",

volume = "70",

pages = "371--382",

journal = "European Economic Review",

issn = "0014-2921",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

AU - Segev, Ella

AU - Sela, Aner

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.

AB - We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants[U+05F3] expected highest effort.

KW - All-pay auctions

KW - Sequential contests

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84903791135&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006

M3 - Article

SN - 0014-2921

VL - 70

SP - 371

EP - 382

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

ER -

Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this