@inproceedings{46bb051dce0c4162bec8096694401ba8,
title = "MUDA: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism",
abstract = "In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.",
author = "Erel Segal-Halevi and Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.; 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018 ; Conference date: 02-02-2018 Through 07-02-2018",
year = "2018",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
series = "32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018",
pages = "1193--1201",
booktitle = "32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2018",
}