Abstract
In coalition governments, parties invest much effort to manage delegation costs to individual ministers. In this article, we examine an intra-executive mechanism for managing delegation costs: Assigning ministerial co-responsibility in cabinet decisions. Using data of cabinet decisions in Israel, we test when and under what conditions co-responsibility is assigned. We find that co-responsibility is assigned strategically by cabinet members weighing the risk of a drift against the costs of imposing co-responsibility. These findings demonstrate an understudied mechanism through which coalition governments narrow ministerial autonomy and informational advantage once policies reach the cabinet. In doing so, this research contributes to a better understanding of policymaking in coalition governments.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1760-1789 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Comparative Political Studies |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 11 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2023 |
Keywords
- cabinet
- cabinet ministers
- coalition government
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science