Matching with couples revisited

Itai Ashlagi; Mark Braverman; Avinatan Hassidim

doi:https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628

Matching with couples revisited

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Pages	335
Number of pages	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628
State	Published - 2011
Externally published	Yes
Event	12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 - San Jose, CA, United States Duration: 5 Jun 2011 → 9 Jun 2011

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Conference

Conference	12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Jose, CA
Period	5/06/11 → 9/06/11

Keywords

market design
matching

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Computer Science Applications
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628

Cite this

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title = "Matching with couples revisited",

abstract = "It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.",

keywords = "market design, matching",

author = "Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim",

note = "Place of conference:USA; 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 ; Conference date: 05-06-2011 Through 09-06-2011",

year = "2011",

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

isbn = "9781450302616",

series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",

pages = "335",

booktitle = "EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",

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AU - Ashlagi, Itai

AU - Braverman, Mark

AU - Hassidim, Avinatan

N1 - Place of conference:USA

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.

AB - It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.

KW - market design

KW - matching

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U2 - https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628

DO - https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993628

M3 - منشور من مؤتمر

SN - 9781450302616

T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

SP - 335

BT - EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

T2 - 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11

Y2 - 5 June 2011 through 9 June 2011

ER -

Matching with couples revisited

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

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Cite this