Manipulation with randomized tie-breaking under Maximin

Michael Zuckerman, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In recent papers, Obraztsova et al. initiated the study of the computational complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tie-breaking [3, 2]. The authors provided a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding an optimal vote for the manipulator (a vote maximizing the manipulator's expected utility) under the Maximin voting rule, for the case where the manipulator's utilities of the candidates are given by the vector (1, 0,...,0). On the other hand, they showed that this problem is NP-hard for the case where the utilities are (1,...,1, 0).
This paper continues that line of research. We prove that when the manipulator's utilities of the candidates are given by the vector (1,...,1, 0,...,0), with k 1's and (m -- k) 0's, then the problem of finding an optimal vote for the manipulator is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by k. Also, by exploring the properties of the graph built by the algorithm, we prove that when a certain sub-graph of this graph contains a 2-cycle, then the solution returned by the algorithm is optimal.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS '12
Subtitle of host publicationProceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Place of PublicationRichland, SC
Pages1315-1316
Number of pages2
Volume3
ISBN (Electronic)9780981738130
StatePublished - Jun 2012

Keywords

  • Computational Social Choice
  • Voting
  • Game Theory

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