Abstract
This chapter inquires after the just distribution of health proper (as distinct from health care), arguing against a Rawlsian approach and in favour of a luck egalitarian one. It demonstrates that the Rawlsian approach of 'fair equality of opportunity for health' is subject to two objections: first, it does not mandate treatment for genetically caused medical conditions; and second, it is forced to mandate an equalization of health, even when unequal health would be of benefit to everyone's health. Since standard luck egalitarianism is just as vulnerable to this second 'leveling down' objection, the luck egalitarian can and ought to revert to a prioritarian pattern of distributing health. Luck prioritarian justice in health thus judges a distribution of health to be just if it promotes the health of those who are not responsible for their low level of health, and among those, gives higher priority to those whose health is (even) worse.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Responsibility and Distributive Justice |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 1-22 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191725463 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199565801 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 May 2011 |
Keywords
- Equality
- Health
- Justice
- Leveling down
- Luck egalitarianism
- Opportunity
- Prioritarianism
- Rawls
- Responsibility
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities