TY - JOUR
T1 - Lost at Sea
T2 - A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism
AU - Segal, Aaron
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
PY - 2020/6/1
Y1 - 2020/6/1
N2 - Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.
AB - Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078013354&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12303
DO - https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12303
M3 - مقالة
SN - 0279-0750
VL - 101
SP - 256
EP - 275
JO - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
IS - 2
ER -