TY - JOUR
T1 - Locally robust implementation and its limits
AU - Jehiel, Philippe
AU - Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
AU - Moldovanu, Benny
N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank seminar audiences at the Princeton Mechanism Design Conference 2010, Toronto and UCLA for helpful comments. This work originated at the Trimester Program on Mechanism Design at the University of Bonn. We are grateful to the Hausdorff Research Institute for Mathematics for its hospitality and financial support.
PY - 2012/11
Y1 - 2012/11
N2 - We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agents' beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust implementable in generic settings with quasi-linear utility, interdependent and bilinear values, and multi-dimensional payoff types.
AB - We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agents' beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust implementable in generic settings with quasi-linear utility, interdependent and bilinear values, and multi-dimensional payoff types.
KW - Interdependent values
KW - Multi-dimensional types
KW - Perturbed beliefs
KW - Robust implementation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84869102163&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.012
M3 - مقالة
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 147
SP - 2439
EP - 2452
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 6
ER -