@inproceedings{ef96798328b346e8826087855f0c1ff3,
title = "Limits of provable security from standard assumptions",
abstract = "We show that the security of some well-known cryptographic protocols, primitives and assumptions (e.g., the Schnorr identification scheme, commitments secure under adaptive selective-decommitment, the 'one-more' discrete logarithm assumption) cannot be based on any standard assumption using a Turing (i.e., black-box) reduction. These results follow from a general result showing that Turing reductions cannot be used to prove security of constant-round sequentially witness-hiding special-sound protocols for unique witness relations, based on standard assumptions; we emphasize that this result holds even if the protocol makes non-black-box use of the underlying assumption.",
keywords = "black-box separations, cryptography, intractability assumptions",
author = "Rafael Pass",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1145/1993636.1993652",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
isbn = "9781450306911",
series = "Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
pages = "109--118",
booktitle = "STOC'11 - Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing",
address = "الولايات المتّحدة",
note = "43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2011 ; Conference date: 06-06-2011 Through 08-06-2011",
}