Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery

Robert Bredereck; Piotr Faliszewski; Rolf Niedermeier; Nimrod Talmon

Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery

Robert Bredereck
, Piotr Faliszewski
, Rolf Niedermeier
, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Editors	Edith Elkind, Rafael H. Bordini, Gerhard Weiss, Pinar Yolum
Pages	67-75
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450337694
State	Published - 1 Jan 2015
Externally published	Yes
Event	14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: 4 May 2015 → 8 May 2015

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume	1

Conference

Conference	14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
Country/Territory	Turkey
City	Istanbul
Period	4/05/15 → 8/05/15

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

Approximation algorithms
Campaign management
Computational complexity
Fixed-parameter tractability
Parameterized complexity
Preference aggregation
Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Control and Systems Engineering
Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Bredereck, R., Faliszewski, P., Niedermeier, R., & Talmon, N. (2015). Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery. In E. Elkind, R. H. Bordini, G. Weiss, & P. Yolum (Eds.), AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 67-75). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 1).

Bredereck, Robert ; Faliszewski, Piotr ; Niedermeier, Rolf et al. / Large-scale election campaigns : Combinatorial shift bribery. AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. editor / Edith Elkind ; Rafael H. Bordini ; Gerhard Weiss ; Pinar Yolum. 2015. pp. 67-75 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

@inproceedings{0c2c3004a8214ec89ed85da534d3b5c8,

title = "Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery",

abstract = "We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.",

keywords = "Approximation algorithms, Campaign management, Computational complexity, Fixed-parameter tractability, Parameterized complexity, Preference aggregation, Voting",

author = "Robert Bredereck and Piotr Faliszewski and Rolf Niedermeier and Nimrod Talmon",

note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.; 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 ; Conference date: 04-05-2015 Through 08-05-2015",

year = "2015",

month = jan,

day = "1",

language = "English",

series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",

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booktitle = "AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",

}

Bredereck, R, Faliszewski, P, Niedermeier, R & Talmon, N 2015, Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery. in E Elkind, RH Bordini, G Weiss & P Yolum (eds), AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 1, pp. 67-75, 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015, Istanbul, Turkey, 4/05/15.

Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery. / Bredereck, Robert; Faliszewski, Piotr; Niedermeier, Rolf et al.
AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. ed. / Edith Elkind; Rafael H. Bordini; Gerhard Weiss; Pinar Yolum. 2015. p. 67-75 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 1).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Large-scale election campaigns

T2 - 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015

AU - Bredereck, Robert

AU - Faliszewski, Piotr

AU - Niedermeier, Rolf

AU - Talmon, Nimrod

PY - 2015/1/1

Y1 - 2015/1/1

N2 - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.

AB - We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the candidate set and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber's favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of the briber's preferred candidate. The combinatorial variant of the problem, introduced in this paper, models settings where it is possible to affect the position of the preferred candidate in multiple votes, either positively or negatively, with a single bribery action. This variant of the problem is particularly interesting in the context of large-scale campaign management problems (which, from the technical side, are modeled as bribery problems). We show that, in general, the combinatorial variant of the problem is highly intractable (NP-hard, hard in the parameterized sense, and hard to approximate), but we provide some (approximation) algorithms for natural restricted cases.

KW - Approximation algorithms

KW - Campaign management

KW - Computational complexity

KW - Fixed-parameter tractability

KW - Parameterized complexity

KW - Preference aggregation

KW - Voting

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84944683988

M3 - Conference contribution

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 67

EP - 75

BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

A2 - Elkind, Edith

A2 - Bordini, Rafael H.

A2 - Weiss, Gerhard

A2 - Yolum, Pinar

Y2 - 4 May 2015 through 8 May 2015

ER -

Bredereck R, Faliszewski P, Niedermeier R, Talmon N. Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery. In Elkind E, Bordini RH, Weiss G, Yolum P, editors, AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. 2015. p. 67-75. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift bribery

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

UN SDGs

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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Cite this