Abstract
I show that David Lewis's principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis's reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams's thesis applies also to his own principal principle.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 837-850 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2013 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science
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