TY - JOUR
T1 - Information in Explaining Cognition
T2 - How to Evaluate It?
AU - Fresco, Nir
N1 - Funding Information: Funding: This research was funded by the Israel Science Foundation Grant 386/20. Funding Information: Acknowledgments: My gratitude goes to all those who contributed to this article both through lively discussions and helpful comments on earlier versions. They include Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Matteo Colombo, Lotem Elber-Dorozko, Tomer Fekete, Eva Jablonka, Gil Lipkin-Shahak, Marcin Miłkowski, Jonathan Najenson, Itay Navon, Andrea Scarantino, Oron Shagrir, Nicholas Shea, Adam Singer, Aaron Sloman, Phillip Staines, Gal Vishne, Marty Wolf and Rotem Yahel. Thanks are also due to several anonymous reviewers and anyone else whom I may have inadvertently omitted. This research was also partly supported by stipendiary fellowships from both Sidney M. Edelstein Centre for History and Philosophy of Science Technology and Medicine, and the Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
PY - 2022/4/1
Y1 - 2022/4/1
N2 - The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.
AB - The claims that “The brain processes information” or “Cognition is information processing” are accepted as truisms in cognitive science. However, it is unclear how to evaluate such claims absent a specification of “information” as it is used by neurocognitive theories. The aim of this article is, thus, to identify the key features of information that information-based neurocognitive theories posit. A systematic identification of these features can reveal the explanatory role that information plays in specific neurocognitive theories, and can, therefore, be both theoretically and practically important. These features can be used, in turn, as desiderata against which candidate theories of information may be evaluated. After discussing some characteristics of explanation in cognitive science and their implications for “information”, three notions are briefly introduced: natural, sensory, and endogenous information. Subsequently, six desiderata are identified and defended based on cognitive scientific practices. The global workspace theory of consciousness is then used as a specific case study that arguably posits either five or six corresponding features of information.
KW - Cognition
KW - Cognitive science
KW - Desiderata
KW - Endogenous information
KW - Natural information
KW - Receiver
KW - Scientific explanation
KW - Semantic information
KW - Sender
KW - Sensory information
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126785269&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7020028
DO - https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7020028
M3 - Article
SN - 2409-9287
VL - 7
JO - Philosophies
JF - Philosophies
IS - 2
M1 - 28
ER -