Abstract
The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that has long been debated in the epistemological literature. This distinction can, arguably, be better understood in terms of a more fundamental distinction between information-how and information-that. Information-how is prescriptive and informs a cognitive agent about which action(s) can be performed to achieve a particular outcome. Information-that is descriptive and informs the agent about events, objects, and states of affairs in the world. Since the latter has received more attention in the epistemological literature, this article focuses on the former.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 58-78 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 94 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2 Jan 2016 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Action
- Cognitive agent
- Goal
- Knowledge-how
- Knowledge-that
- Semantic information
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy