TY - JOUR
T1 - In Wrong anticipation - Miscalibrated beliefs between germans, israelis, and palestinians
AU - Goerg, Sebastian J.
AU - Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
AU - Walkowitz, Gari
AU - Winter, Eyal
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Goerg et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2016/6
Y1 - 2016/6
N2 - The reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an investee/allocator. We found a notable constellation of calibrated and un-calibrated beliefs. Within each country, transfer standards exist, which investees correctly anticipate within their country. However, across countries these standards differ. By attributing the standard of their own environment to the other countries investees are remarkably bad in predicting foreign investors' behavior. The tendency to ignore this potential difference can be a source of misinterpreting motives in cross-country interaction. Foreigners might perceive behavior as unfavorable or favorable differentiation, even though-unknown to them-investors actually treat fellow-country people and foreigners alike.
AB - The reconcilability of actions and beliefs in inter-country relationships, either in business or politics, is of vital importance as incorrect beliefs on foreigners' behavior can have serious implications. We study a typical inter-country interaction by means of a controlled laboratory investment game experiment in Germany, Israel and Palestine involving 400 student participants in total. An investor has to take a risky decision in a foreign country that involves transferring money to an investee/allocator. We found a notable constellation of calibrated and un-calibrated beliefs. Within each country, transfer standards exist, which investees correctly anticipate within their country. However, across countries these standards differ. By attributing the standard of their own environment to the other countries investees are remarkably bad in predicting foreign investors' behavior. The tendency to ignore this potential difference can be a source of misinterpreting motives in cross-country interaction. Foreigners might perceive behavior as unfavorable or favorable differentiation, even though-unknown to them-investors actually treat fellow-country people and foreigners alike.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84976427966&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0156998
DO - https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0156998
M3 - مقالة
C2 - 27311066
SN - 1932-6203
VL - 11
JO - PLoS ONE
JF - PLoS ONE
IS - 6
M1 - e0156998
ER -
