Impossibility of strong kdm security with auxiliary input

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We show that a strong notion of KDM security cannot be obtained by any encryption scheme in the auxiliary input setting, assuming Learning With Errors (LWE) and one-way permutations. The notion of security we deal with guarantees that for any (possibly inefficient) function f, it is computationally hard to distinguish between an encryption of $$\mathbf {0}$$ and an encryption of $$f(\mathsf {pk}, z)$$, where $$\mathsf {pk} $$ is the public key and z is the auxiliary input. Furthermore, we show that this holds even when restricted to bounded-length auxiliary input where z is much shorter than $$\mathsf {pk} $$ under the additional assumption that (non-leveled) fully homomorphic encryption exists.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationSecurity and Cryptography for Networks - 12th International Conference, SCN 2020, Proceedings
EditorsClemente Galdi, Vladimir Kolesnikov
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages512-524
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)9783030579890
DOIs
StatePublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2020 - Amalfi, Italy
Duration: 14 Sep 202016 Sep 2020

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume12238 LNCS

Conference

Conference12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, SCN 2020
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityAmalfi
Period14/09/2016/09/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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