Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

Sergey Kuniavsky; Rann Smorodinsky

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005

Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	499-503
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	121
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005
State	Published - Dec 2013

Keywords

Congestion games
Equilibrium
Greediness

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005

Cite this

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title = "Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games",

abstract = "We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.",

keywords = "Congestion games, Equilibrium, Greediness",

author = "Sergey Kuniavsky and Rann Smorodinsky",

note = "Funding Information: The first author{\textquoteright}s financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through GRK 801 is gratefully acknowledged. The second author{\textquoteright}s work is supported by the joint Microsoft–Technion e-Commerce lab, Technion VPR grants and the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion .",

year = "2013",

month = dec,

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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T1 - Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

AU - Kuniavsky, Sergey

AU - Smorodinsky, Rann

N1 - Funding Information: The first author’s financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through GRK 801 is gratefully acknowledged. The second author’s work is supported by the joint Microsoft–Technion e-Commerce lab, Technion VPR grants and the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion .

PY - 2013/12

Y1 - 2013/12

N2 - We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

AB - We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

KW - Congestion games

KW - Equilibrium

KW - Greediness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84886850416&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005

DO - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005

M3 - مقالة

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 121

SP - 499

EP - 503

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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