Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)499-503
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2013


  • Congestion games
  • Equilibrium
  • Greediness

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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