From Symbol to ‘Symbol’, to Abstract Symbol: Response to Copeland and Shagrir on Turing-Machine Realism Versus Turing-Machine Purism

In their recent paper “Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable?” Copeland and Shagrir (Minds Mach 21:221–239, 2011) draw a distinction between a purist conception of Turing machines, according to which these machines are purely abstract, and Turing machine realism according to which Turing machines are spatio-temporal and causal “notional" machines. In the present response to that paper we concede the realistic aspects of Turing’s own presentation of his machines, pointed out by Copeland and Shagrir, but argue that Turing's treatment of symbols in the course of that presentation opens the door for later purist conceptions. Also, we argue that a purist conception of Turing machines (as well as other computational models) plays an important role not only in the analysis of the computational properties of Turing machines, but also in the philosophical debates over the nature of their realization.