@inproceedings{714590c73c24453792436f8c32b59572,
title = "From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail",
abstract = "We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design and symmetric contestants. The goal of the contest designers is to maximize the contestants' sum of efforts. Our main result shows that optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest) form an equilibrium in the model with competition among contests. Under a very natural assumption these contests are in fact dominant, and the equilibria that they form are unique. Moreover, equilibria with the optimal contests are Pareto-optimal even in cases where other equilibria emerge. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare.",
author = "Xiaotie Deng and Yotam Gafni and Ron Lavi and Tao Lin and Hongyi Ling",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2023, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.; 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 ; Conference date: 07-02-2023 Through 14-02-2023",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
day = "27",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
series = "Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023",
pages = "5608--5615",
editor = "Brian Williams and Yiling Chen and Jennifer Neville",
booktitle = "AAAI-23 Technical Tracks 5",
}