Abstract
In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic where logical terms no longer play a distinctive role. This account employs a new notion of semantic constraints. The paper includes some preliminary definitions and results in the new framework.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 259-276 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Logique et Analyse |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 227 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Sep 2014 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy