TY - JOUR
T1 - For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures
AU - Hannikainen, Ivar R.
AU - Machery, Edouard
AU - Rose, David
AU - Stich, Stephen
AU - Olivola, Christopher Y.
AU - Sousa, Paulo
AU - Cova, Florian
AU - Buchtel, Emma E.
AU - Alai, Mario
AU - Angelucci, Adriano
AU - Berniûnas, Renatas
AU - Chatterjee, Amita
AU - Cheon, Hyundeuk
AU - Cho, In Rae
AU - Cohnitz, Daniel
AU - Dranseika, Vilius
AU - Eraña Lagos, Ángeles
AU - Ghadakpour, Laleh
AU - Grinberg, Maurice
AU - Hashimoto, Takaaki
AU - Horowitz, Amir
AU - Hristova, Evgeniya
AU - Jraissati, Yasmina
AU - Kadreva, Veselina
AU - Karasawa, Kaori
AU - Kim, Hackjin
AU - Kim, Yeonjeong
AU - Lee, Minwoo
AU - Mauro, Carlos
AU - Mizumoto, Masaharu
AU - Moruzzi, Sebastiano
AU - Ornelas, Jorge
AU - Osimani, Barbara
AU - Romero, Carlos
AU - Rosas López, Alejandro
AU - Sangoi, Massimo
AU - Sereni, Andrea
AU - Songhorian, Sarah
AU - Struchiner, Noel
AU - Tripodi, Vera
AU - Usui, Naoki
AU - Vázquez del Mercado, Alejandro
AU - Vosgerichian, Hrag A.
AU - Zhang, Xueyi
AU - Zhu, Jing
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © Copyright © 2019 Hannikainen, Machery, Rose, Stich, Olivola, Sousa, Cova, Buchtel, Alai, Angelucci, Berniûnas, Chatterjee, Cheon, Cho, Cohnitz, Dranseika, Eraña Lagos, Ghadakpour, Grinberg, Hashimoto, Horowitz, Hristova, Jraissati, Kadreva, Karasawa, Kim, Kim, Lee, Mauro, Mizumoto, Moruzzi, Ornelas, Osimani, Romero, Rosas López, Sangoi, Sereni, Songhorian, Struchiner, Tripodi, Usui, Vázquez del Mercado, Vosgerichian, Zhang and Zhu.
PY - 2019/11/5
Y1 - 2019/11/5
N2 - Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
AB - Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
KW - alternate possibilities
KW - cognitive style
KW - compatibilism
KW - dispositionism
KW - free will
KW - situationism
KW - sourcehood
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075388573&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428
DO - https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02428
M3 - مقالة
C2 - 31749739
SN - 1664-1078
VL - 10
JO - Frontiers in Psychology
JF - Frontiers in Psychology
M1 - 2428
ER -