Flat Physicalism

Meir Hemmo; Orly Shenker

doi:10.1111/theo.12396

Flat Physicalism

Meir Hemmo, Orly Shenker

University of Haifa, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Abstract This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism, and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ?physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	743-764
Number of pages	22
Journal	Theoria
Volume	88
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12396
State	Published - 2021

Keywords

identity theory
multiple realisation (realisability)
physical kinds
physicalism
reduction
special sciences
statistical mechanics

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy

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10.1111/theo.12396License: CC BY-NC

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/theo.12396License: CC BY-NC

Cite this

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title = "Flat Physicalism",

abstract = "Abstract This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism, and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ?physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations.",

keywords = "identity theory, multiple realisation (realisability), physical kinds, physicalism, reduction, special sciences, statistical mechanics",

author = "Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to the helpful discussions with the participants of the workshop on The Multi‐Level Structure of Reality at the Israeli Institute for Advanced Studies, May 2018. The research towards this paper was supported by grants 1148/18 and 690/21 of the Israeli Science Foundation. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.",

year = "2021",

doi = "10.1111/theo.12396",

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N1 - Funding Information: We are grateful to the helpful discussions with the participants of the workshop on The Multi‐Level Structure of Reality at the Israeli Institute for Advanced Studies, May 2018. The research towards this paper was supported by grants 1148/18 and 690/21 of the Israeli Science Foundation. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Abstract This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism, and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ?physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations.

AB - Abstract This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism, and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ?physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations.

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KW - multiple realisation (realisability)

KW - physical kinds

KW - physicalism

KW - reduction

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JO - Theoria

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ER -

Flat Physicalism

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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