Abstract

The n-player Hotelling game calls for each player to choose a point on the line segment, so as to maximize the size of his Voronoi cell. This paper studies fault-tolerant versions of the Hotelling game. Two fault models are studied. The first assumes that the environment is prone to failure: with some probability, a disconnection occurs at a random point on the line, splitting it into two separate segments and modifying each player’s Voronoi cell accordingly. A complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this variant is provided for every n. Additionally, a one-to-one correspondence is shown between equilibria of this variant and of the Hotelling game with no faults. The second fault model assumes the players are prone to failure: each player is removed from the game with i.i.d. probability, changing the payoffs of the remaining players accordingly. It is shown that for n ≥ 3 this variant of the game has no Nash equilibria.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing
EditorsJu Bin Song, Husheng Li, Marceau Coupechoux
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages133-142
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-93058-9
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-93057-2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019

Publication series

NameEAI/Springer Innovations in Communication and Computing

Keywords

  • Hotelling Game
  • Inside Service
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Peripheral Services
  • Voronoi Cell

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Health Informatics

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