Fast convergence of best-reply dynamics in aggregative games

Yakov Babichenko

doi:10.1287/moor.2017.0868

Fast convergence of best-reply dynamics in aggregative games

Yakov Babichenko

Data and Decision Sciences

Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in quasi-linear (in n) number of steps, and the quasi-linear bound is tight. Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially (in n) close to 1.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	333-346
Number of pages	14
Journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	43
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0868
State	Published - Feb 2018

Keywords

Aggregative games
Best-reply dynamics
Cournot oligopoly
Fast convergence
Nash equilibrium
Small influence games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Computer Science Applications
General Mathematics
Management Science and Operations Research

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10.1287/moor.2017.0868

Cite this

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abstract = "We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in quasi-linear (in n) number of steps, and the quasi-linear bound is tight. Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially (in n) close to 1.",

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AB - We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in quasi-linear (in n) number of steps, and the quasi-linear bound is tight. Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially (in n) close to 1.

KW - Aggregative games

KW - Best-reply dynamics

KW - Cournot oligopoly

KW - Fast convergence

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Small influence games

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JO - Mathematics of Operations Research

JF - Mathematics of Operations Research

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Fast convergence of best-reply dynamics in aggregative games

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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