Abstract
We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in quasi-linear (in n) number of steps, and the quasi-linear bound is tight. Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially (in n) close to 1.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 333-346 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 43 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2018 |
Keywords
- Aggregative games
- Best-reply dynamics
- Cournot oligopoly
- Fast convergence
- Nash equilibrium
- Small influence games
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science Applications
- General Mathematics
- Management Science and Operations Research