Fast convergence of best-reply dynamics in aggregative games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider small-influence aggregative games with a large number of players n. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria in quasi-linear (in n) number of steps, and the quasi-linear bound is tight. Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency that is exponentially (in n) close to 1.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-346
Number of pages14
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2018


  • Aggregative games
  • Best-reply dynamics
  • Cournot oligopoly
  • Fast convergence
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Small influence games

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science Applications
  • General Mathematics
  • Management Science and Operations Research


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