TY - JOUR
T1 - Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements
AU - Babaioff, Moshe
AU - Ezra, Tomer
AU - Feige, Uriel
N1 - T. Ezra's research is partially supported by the European Research Council Advanced [Grant 788893] AMDROMA "Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets" and MIUR PRIM project ALGADIMAR "Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets." U. Feige's research is supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1122/22] .
PY - 2023/10/26
Y1 - 2023/10/26
N2 - We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maxi min share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent's MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies APSPMMS, for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 3 5 fraction of the
AB - We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maxi min share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent's MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies APSPMMS, for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 3 5 fraction of the
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.0199
DO - https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.0199
M3 - مقالة
SN - 0364-765X
JO - Mathematics of Operations Research
JF - Mathematics of Operations Research
ER -