Explicitly Simple Near-Tie Auctions

Reshef Meir, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


We consider the problem of truthfully auctioning a single item, that can be either fractionally or probabilistically divided among several winners when their bids are sufficiently close to a tie. While Myerson’s Lemma states that any monotone allocation rule can be implemented, truthful payments are computed by integrating over each profile, and may be difficult to comprehend and explain. We look for payment rules that are given explicitly as a simple function of the allocated fraction and the others’ bids. For two agents, this simply coincides with (non-negative) Myerson’s payments. For three agents or more, we characterize the near-tie allocation rules that admit such explicit payments, and provide an iterative algorithm to compute them. In particular we show that any such payment rule must require positive payments to some of the bidders.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, SAGT 2022, Proceedings
EditorsPanagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros Voudouris
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9783031157134
StatePublished - 2022
Externally publishedYes
Event15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022 - Colchester, United Kingdom
Duration: 12 Sep 202215 Sep 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume13584 LNCS


Conference15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom


  • Diversity
  • Mechanism design
  • Simplicity

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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