Abstract
The executive compensation literature has explored the executive pay-forperformance relation in various contexts and reported mixed findings. As a result, the question of whether executive incentives, and particularly stock options, are effective continues to pose a puzzle to researchers. Gong (2011) uses a long window to examine effectiveness of executive compensation. This note discusses several broad aspects of pay-for-performance studies and their potential manifestation in this line of research and in Gong's study. Specifically, I elaborate on measurement issues and on each of the following aspects: (1) the underlying paradigm: arm's-length contracting versus managerial power; (2) the distinction between the pay-for-performance relationship and CEO overpay; (3) market efficiency; and (4) the settling-up problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 29-36 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Journal of Management Accounting Research |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2011 |
Keywords
- CEO tenure
- Executive compensation
- Review
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Accounting
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