@article{e79ed48dd5f44c16b6322a10ccb3484e,
title = "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design",
abstract = "We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents - all ex post efficient allocations are. In environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced {"}Groves in expectations{"} allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs - all ex post efficient allocations are.",
keywords = "Ex post renegotiation, Implementation, Mechanism design",
author = "Zvika Neeman and Gregory Pavlov",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Eddie Dekel, Fran{\c c}oise Forges, Maria Goltsman, Johannes H{\"o}rner, Bart Lipman, Dilip Mookherjee, Michel Poitevin, Pasquale Schiraldi and the seminar participants at Arizona State University, Boston University, the Hebrew University, Universit{\'e} de Montr{\'e}al, Tel Aviv University, Toulouse, Vienna, University of Western Ontario, CETC (Montreal, 2007), Decentralization conference (Ann Arbor, 2007), World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Evanston, 2008), and mechanism design conference (Bonn, 2009) for helpful comments and conversations. We are also grateful to the editor and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments. Neemanʼs research was supported in part by the ISF and by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions . All remaining errors are ours.",
year = "2013",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.003",
language = "الإنجليزيّة",
volume = "148",
pages = "473--501",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "2",
}