TY - JOUR
T1 - Evidence games
T2 - Truth and commitment
AU - Hart, Sergiu
AU - Kremer, Ilan
AU - Perry, Motty
N1 - Funding Information: European Research Council (ERC). Kremer's research partially supported by a grant of the European Research Council (ERC).
PY - 2017/3
Y1 - 2017/3
N2 - An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome. (JEL C72, D82, D83, K41).
AB - An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome. (JEL C72, D82, D83, K41).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85017377410&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1257/aer.20150913
DO - 10.1257/aer.20150913
M3 - مقالة
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 107
SP - 690
EP - 713
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -