Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties

Liron Ravner

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.005

Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	456-468
Number of pages	13
Journal	European Journal of Operational Research
Volume	239
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.005
State	Published - 1 Dec 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Queueing
Queueing games
Strategic arrival times to a queue

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Computer Science
Modelling and Simulation
Management Science and Operations Research
Information Systems and Management

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10.1016/j.ejor.2014.06.005

Cite this

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title = "Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties",

abstract = "Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.",

keywords = "Queueing, Queueing games, Strategic arrival times to a queue",

author = "Liron Ravner",

note = "Funding Information: The author would like to thank Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz, Refael Hassin and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and advice throughout this work. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 1319/11 and the Center for the Study of Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem .",

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N2 - Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.

AB - Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.

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JO - European Journal of Operational Research

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ER -

Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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