Abstract
In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as is the case in many developing countries. Our theory shows that in such a context high levels of electoral competition may have perverse effects on corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 106640 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 227 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 2024 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions -
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals
Keywords
- Accountability
- Audit
- Corruption
- Electoral competition
- Uncertainty
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
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