Egalitarian committee scoring rules

Haris Aziz, Piotr Faliszewski, Bernard Grofman, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We introduce and study the class of egalitarian variants of committee scoring rules, where instead of summing up the scores that voters assign to committees-as is done in the utilitarian variants-the score of a committee is taken to be the lowest score assigned to it by any voter. We focus on five rules, which are egalitarian analogues of SNTV, the k-Borda rule, the Chamberlin-Courant rule, the Bloc rule, and the Pessimist rule. We establish their computational complexity, provide their initial axiomatic study, and perform experiments to represent the action of these rules graphically.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
EditorsJerome Lang
Pages56-62
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241127
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018
Event27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: 13 Jul 201819 Jul 2018

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2018-July

Conference

Conference27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
Country/TerritorySweden
CityStockholm
Period13/07/1819/07/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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