Abstract
We study elimination tournaments with n stages and 2n symmetric players. The players have effort budgets that decrease within the stages proportionally to the efforts allocated in the previous stages such that for each effort unit that a player allocates, he loses α (the fatigue parameter) units of effort from his budget. We show that if the fatigue parameter α is larger than [Formula presented], the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first t stages, t≤n−1. In particular, if the fatigue parameter α is larger than [Formula presented], the players allocate their efforts equally over all the first n−1 stages, and only in the final stage, they exert a lower effort.
Original language | American English |
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Article number | 110261 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Volume | 211 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Feb 2022 |
Keywords
- Elimination tournaments
- Knockout tournaments
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics