Efficient resolution of partnership disputes

Daniel Fershtman, Béla Szabadi, Cédric Wasser

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one- and two-sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute-resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second-best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)543-569
Number of pages27
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2023

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Efficient resolution of partnership disputes'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this