TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains
AU - Zur, Roi Bar
AU - Eyal, Ittay
AU - Tamar, Aviv
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 ACM.
PY - 2020/10/21
Y1 - 2020/10/21
N2 - A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish mining - deviate from the protocol to gain more than their fair share. Such systems are thus secure if all miners are smaller than a threshold size so their best response is following the protocol. To find the threshold, one has to identify the optimal strategy for miners of different sizes, i.e., solve a Markov Decision Process (MDP). However, because of the PoW difficulty adjustment mechanism, the miners' utility is a non-linear ratio function. We therefore call this an Average Reward Ratio (ARR) MDP. Sapirshtein et al. were the frst to solve ARR MDPs by solving a series of standard MDPs that converge to the ARR MDP solution. In this work, we present a novel technique for solving an ARR MDP by solving a single standard MDP. The crux of our approach is to augment the MDP such that it terminates randomly, within an expected number of rounds. We call this Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO), and the technique applies to any MDP whose utility is a ratio function. We bound the approximation error of PTO - it is inversely proportional to the expected number of rounds before termination, a parameter that we control. Empirically, PTO's complexity is an order of magnitude lower than the state of the art. PTO can be easily applied to different blockchains. We use it to tighten the bound on the threshold for selfish mining in Ethereum.
AB - A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish mining - deviate from the protocol to gain more than their fair share. Such systems are thus secure if all miners are smaller than a threshold size so their best response is following the protocol. To find the threshold, one has to identify the optimal strategy for miners of different sizes, i.e., solve a Markov Decision Process (MDP). However, because of the PoW difficulty adjustment mechanism, the miners' utility is a non-linear ratio function. We therefore call this an Average Reward Ratio (ARR) MDP. Sapirshtein et al. were the frst to solve ARR MDPs by solving a series of standard MDPs that converge to the ARR MDP solution. In this work, we present a novel technique for solving an ARR MDP by solving a single standard MDP. The crux of our approach is to augment the MDP such that it terminates randomly, within an expected number of rounds. We call this Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO), and the technique applies to any MDP whose utility is a ratio function. We bound the approximation error of PTO - it is inversely proportional to the expected number of rounds before termination, a parameter that we control. Empirically, PTO's complexity is an order of magnitude lower than the state of the art. PTO can be easily applied to different blockchains. We use it to tighten the bound on the threshold for selfish mining in Ethereum.
KW - Bitcoin
KW - Blockchain
KW - Cryptocurrency
KW - Ethereum
KW - Markov Decision Process
KW - Optimal Selfish Mining
KW - Proof of Work
KW - Selfish Mining
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85097065281&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - https://doi.org/10.1145/3419614.3423264
DO - https://doi.org/10.1145/3419614.3423264
M3 - منشور من مؤتمر
T3 - AFT 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
SP - 113
EP - 131
BT - AFT 2020 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
T2 - 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, AFT 2020
Y2 - 21 October 2020 through 23 October 2020
ER -