Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.04.002

Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

University of Haifa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash's axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive analogous results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	246-249
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	42
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.04.002
State	Published - May 2014

Keywords

Bargaining
Efficiency
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2014.04.002

Cite this

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AB - Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash's axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive analogous results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Efficiency

KW - Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

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JO - Operations Research Letters

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Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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