Efficiency-free characterizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

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Abstract

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash's axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive analogous results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)246-249
Number of pages4
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume42
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2014

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Efficiency
  • Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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