Abstract
This paper illustrates the benefits of applying mechanism design techniques to questions in revenue management, in particular to dynamic allocation and pricing problems. It is demonstrated that the solution to a sequential stochastic assignment problem under complete information can also be implemented under incomplete information by a variation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. More generally, we argue that the mechanism design focus on implementable allocations rather than on prices yields many valuable insights about dynamic RM models. Finally, we also briefly survey some of the recent literature on dynamic mechanism design.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 283-286 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
Volume | 30 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2012 |
Keywords
- Dynamic mechanism design
- Revenue-management
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering