DYCOM: A dynamic truthful budget balanced double-sided combinatorial market

Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Recently, there has been increased attention on finding solutions for double-sided markets with strategic buying and selling agents. We present and evaluate the first dynamic double-sided combinatorial market, named DYCOM, that allows truthful and individually-rational behavior for both buying and selling agents, keeps the market budget balanced and approximates social welfare efficiency. We experimentally examine the allocative efficiency of DYCOM. DYCOM performs well by all benchmarks and in many cases improves on previous mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsEdmund Durfee, Michael Winikoff, Kate Larson, Sanmay Das
Pages1556-1558
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
StatePublished - 2017
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: 8 May 201712 May 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume3

Conference

Conference16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
Country/TerritoryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period8/05/1712/05/17

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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