Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: An example

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.010

Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: An example

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

University of Haifa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I present an example of a symmetric repeated game in which an arbitrarily small change in the discount factor can lead to a discontinuous change in the level of symmetry that can be sustained in equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-3
Number of pages	3
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	48
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.010
State	Published - Jan 2020

Keywords

Repeated games
Symmetric equilibrium
Symmetric games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.010

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title = "Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: An example",

abstract = "I present an example of a symmetric repeated game in which an arbitrarily small change in the discount factor can lead to a discontinuous change in the level of symmetry that can be sustained in equilibrium.",

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author = "Shiran Rachmilevitch",

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Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: An example

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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