Diachronic Self-Making

David Mark Kovacs

doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323

Diachronic Self-Making

David Mark Kovacs

Department of Philosophy

Tel Aviv University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View (DSV), the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	349-362
Number of pages	14
Journal	Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	98
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323
State	Published - 2 Apr 2020

Keywords

animalism
conventionalism
four-dimensionalism
perdurantism
personal identity
too many thinkers

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Philosophy

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323

Cite this

@article{55c98280b17841128b75e88f0d138af8,

title = "Diachronic Self-Making",

abstract = "This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View (DSV), the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright}-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one{\textquoteright}s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.",

keywords = "animalism, conventionalism, four-dimensionalism, perdurantism, personal identity, too many thinkers",

author = "Kovacs, {David Mark}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, {\textcopyright} 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy.",

year = "2020",

month = apr,

day = "2",

doi = "https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323",

language = "الإنجليزيّة",

volume = "98",

pages = "349--362",

journal = "Australasian Journal of Philosophy",

issn = "0004-8402",

publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Diachronic Self-Making

AU - Kovacs, David Mark

PY - 2020/4/2

Y1 - 2020/4/2

N2 - This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View (DSV), the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.

AB - This paper develops the Diachronic Self-Making View (DSV), the view that we are the non-accidentally best candidate referents of our ‘I’-beliefs. A formulation and defence of DSV is followed by an overview of its treatment of familiar puzzle cases about personal identity. The rest of the paper focuses on a challenge to DSV, the Puzzle of Inconstant ‘I’-beliefs: the view appears to force on us inconsistent verdicts about personal identity in cases that we would naturally describe as changes in one’s de se beliefs. To solve this problem, the paper defends the possibility of overlapping people, and addresses a number of objections to this idea.

KW - animalism

KW - conventionalism

KW - four-dimensionalism

KW - perdurantism

KW - personal identity

KW - too many thinkers

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066904002&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323

DO - https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1617323

M3 - مقالة

SN - 0004-8402

VL - 98

SP - 349

EP - 362

JO - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

JF - Australasian Journal of Philosophy

IS - 2

ER -

Diachronic Self-Making

Abstract

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this