Abstract
We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to Shmaya (2011) entail determinacy of the game. We generalize Shmaya's (2011) result and show that in the stochastic learning environment SEPM implies determinacy while WSEPM does not.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 166-185 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 91 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 May 2015 |
Keywords
- Determinacy
- Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
- Zero-sum stochastic games
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics