@inproceedings{ba7457f4479f4df5b4a8013b477711e3,
title = "Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules",
abstract = "Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.",
keywords = "Equilibrium, Iterative voting, Social choice",
author = "Aaron Koolyk and Omer Lev and Rosenschein, {Jeffrey S.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.; 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 ; Conference date: 09-05-2016 Through 13-05-2016",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "American English",
series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",
pages = "1329--1330",
booktitle = "AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
}