Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

Aaron Koolyk; Omer Lev; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

Aaron Koolyk, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Place of Publication	Richland, SC
Pages	1329-1330
Number of pages	2
ISBN (Electronic)	9781450342391
State	Published - 1 Jan 2016
Event	15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 9 May 2016 → 13 May 2016

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Conference

Conference	15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
Country/Territory	Singapore
City	Singapore
Period	9/05/16 → 13/05/16

Keywords

Equilibrium
Iterative voting
Social choice

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Artificial Intelligence
Software
Control and Systems Engineering

Access to Document

http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2937144License: Unspecified

Cite this

Koolyk, A., Lev, O., & Rosenschein, J. S. (2016). Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules. In AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 1329-1330). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2937144

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title = "Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules",

abstract = "Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.",

keywords = "Equilibrium, Iterative voting, Social choice",

author = "Aaron Koolyk and Omer Lev and Rosenschein, {Jeffrey S.}",

note = "Funding Information: This research has been partly funded by Microsoft Research through its PhD Scholarship Program, and by Israel Science Foundation grant #1227/12. Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.; 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 ; Conference date: 09-05-2016 Through 13-05-2016",

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language = "English",

series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",

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booktitle = "AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",

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Koolyk, A, Lev, O & Rosenschein, JS 2016, Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules. in AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, Richland, SC, pp. 1329-1330, 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016, Singapore, Singapore, 9/05/16. <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2937144>

Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules. / Koolyk, Aaron; Lev, Omer ; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Richland, SC, 2016. p. 1329-1330 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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T1 - Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

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AU - Lev, Omer

AU - Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

N1 - Funding Information: This research has been partly funded by Microsoft Research through its PhD Scholarship Program, and by Israel Science Foundation grant #1227/12. Publisher Copyright: Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.

AB - Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.

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KW - Iterative voting

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T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

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EP - 1330

BT - AAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

CY - Richland, SC

T2 - 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016

Y2 - 9 May 2016 through 13 May 2016

ER -

Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Access to Document

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Cite this